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FAIR USE HARBORS
Gideon Parchomovsky! and Kevin A. Goldman**

T

HE doctrine of fair use was originally intended to facilitate those socially
optimal uses of copyrighted material that would otherwise constitute infringement. Yet the application of the law has become so unpredictable that
would-be fair-users can rarely rely on the doctrine with any significant level of
confidence. Moreover, the doctrine provides no defense for those seeking to
make fair uses of material protected by anticircumvention measures. As a result, artists working in media both new and old are unable to derive from
copyrighted works the full value to which the public is entitled. In this Essay,
we propose a solution to the uncertainty and unpredictability that plague the
doctrine: nonexclusive safe harbors that define minimum levels of copying as
per se fair uses. These bright-line rules would provide the clarity needed to facilitate countless productive uses that are currently being chilled. Furthermore,
by providing an ex ante test for identifying uses as fair, these safe harbors provide a framework for salvaging fair use in the digital age.
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INTRODUCTION
Fair use is at once the most important and the most “troublesome”1
doctrine in copyright law. By legitimizing certain unauthorized uses
of copyrighted works, fair use aims to secure a delicate balance between the rights of content owners and the interests of the public.
In its current form, the doctrine falls short of achieving this goal.
To see why, it is necessary to understand the role and design of
copyright law.
Copyright law purports to perform two potentially conflicting
functions. First, copyright promotes the production of new works
by recognizing and protecting property rights in original expressive
works. Specifically, the Copyright Act grants to content owners the
exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly perform,
and publicly display copyrighted works.2 The rights of owners are
formulated in clear terms and have been construed broadly by the
courts.3

1
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1929) (dubbing fair use
the “most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright”).
2
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(5) (2000). The section also recognizes the right of copyright
owners in sound recordings to digitally perform the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
3
For discussion, see infra Part I.
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Yet the rights of owners are not absolute. The copyright scheme
limits these rights in order to promote its second aim: ensuring the
optimal use of works after they have been created. Thus, the law
recognizes a privilege in the public to utilize copyrighted works by
incorporating a general fair use defense.4 In theory, fair use should
be a significant limitation on the rights of authors. It sanctions private takings of intellectual property without requiring the payment
of compensation. In reality, however, it is more bark than bite: fair
use’s ability to shield unauthorized users is greatly undermined by
the uncertainty that has become the hallmark of the doctrine.
Since its inception over two and half centuries ago, neither the
courts nor the legislature have provided a useful definition of fair
use, nor have they devised a meaningful method for determining
which uses are fair.5 Instead, the Copyright Act lists essentially four
different tests for judges to apply in making fair use determinations. It requires courts to consider the purpose of the unauthorized use, the nature of the protected work, the amount and substantiality of the material taken from the work, and the effect of
the unauthorized use on the market for the protected work. The
Act does not indicate how to rank the tests in cases of conflict, presumably leaving this task to the courts. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has consciously avoided devising an internal hierarchy among the factors, insisting that fair use remain “an equitable
rule of reason”6 whose application depends on the specific facts of
each individual case.7
All this might not be of such concern if judges shared a common
understanding of fair use. However, as Judge Pierre Leval has
openly admitted, they do not.8 Indeed, the case law is characterized
by widely divergent interpretations of fair use, divided courts, and
4

17 U.S.C. § 107.
See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
1105, 1105–06 (1990) (noting that the legislature provided courts with scant guidance
as to how to decide fair use cases and that “judges generally have neither complained
of the absence of guidance, nor made substantial efforts to fill the void”).
6
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 & n.31 (1984) (referring to fair use as an “equitable rule of reason”).
7
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (“[F]air use
analysis must always be tailored to the individual case.”).
8
Leval, supra note 5, at 1106 (stating that “[j]udges do not share a consensus on the
meaning of fair use”).
5
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frequent reversals. This state of affairs has prompted a leading
commentator to conclude that the doctrine of fair use is impervious
to generalization and that attempts to derive its meaning from
careful analysis of specific cases are futile.9
The Supreme Court’s decision to favor ex post fairness over ex
ante certainty comes at a steep cost for potential users of copyrighted works. As the law and economics literature has pointed
out, ambiguous standards, such as fair use, invariably lead to overdeterrence, which, in turn, will cause potential defendants to overinvest in precautions.10 The intuition behind this result is straightforward: the more a defendant has invested in precautions, the less
likely a court will be to find her liable. Accordingly, the ambiguity
of the fair use doctrine works as a one-way ratchet that will in
many cases lead to the underuse of copyrighted works.
The overdeterrence problem is compounded by the nature of
copyrighted works and the wide arsenal of remedies the law provides to copyright owners. Copyrighted works are information
goods, and, as such, they invariably create spillovers (or positive
externalities).11 Consequently, a user who incorporates protected
expression into her work without permission from the copyright
owners can never capture the full social benefit of the use but still
stands to bear the full social cost. Moreover, plaintiffs in copyright
cases can readily obtain injunctions and monetary awards in excess
of their harm. The Copyright Act entitles successful plaintiffs to

9
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 1137, 1138 (1990) (expressing doubt that “the results in concrete cases can be
made predictably responsive to a limited set of definite principles—certainly not
large, general principles and not very often even more specific, intermediate ones”).
10
See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 995 (1984) (noting that when
the “probability [of liability] declines as defendants take more care, then defendants
may tend to overcomply”); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279, 280 (1986) (similar); A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L.
Rev. 869, 873 (1998) (observing that “if injurers are made to pay more than for the
harm they cause, wasteful precautions may be taken . . . and risky but socially beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed”).
11
On spillovers and whether the law should do something about them, see Brett M.
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257 (2007) (arguing
why the law should not strive to internalize informational spillovers and other positive
externalities).
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the defendant’s profits12 and to statutory damages of up to $150,000
per work willfully infringed.13 This means that while the benefit a
typical user could derive from a small unauthorized borrowing is
rather modest, the potential liability is quite substantial.14
Users of copyrighted expression can respond to the uncertainty
of the fair use doctrine by adopting two types of precautions. When
transaction costs are sufficiently low,15 they may attempt to secure a
license from the copyright owner.16 When transaction costs are high
or in the presence of strategic holdouts,17 users will copy less protected expression than they are legally entitled to or refrain from
using copyrighted expression altogether. While both responses are
socially wasteful,18 the second is particularly troubling as it means
that certain socially valuable projects may not be carried out.
The highly acclaimed Eyes on the Prize documentary series,
which chronicles the American civil rights movement, is a prime
example.19 For over a decade, the series could not be broadcast or
sold because the permission to use archival footage—depicting
protest marches, bus boycotts, and confrontations with Southern
12

17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2000) (stating that a copyright infringer is liable for any of
“the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer”).
13
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
14
And for companies whose business plans depend on fair use, the results can be
disastrous. See, e.g., UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, No. 00-CIV-472(JSR), 2000 WL
1262568, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000) (finding MP3.com liable for approximately
$118 million in statutory damages); see also J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive
Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 525,
545–49 (2004) (discussing the punitive nature of statutory damages for copyright infringement).
15
On the connection between fair use and transaction costs, see Professor Wendy
Gordon’s classic, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1608, 1614–15
(1982) (listing high transaction costs as a prerequisite to a fair use finding).
16
For an excellent discussion, see James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 887–95 (2007); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (2005).
17
See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets,
89 Va. L. Rev. 1857, 1858 (2003) (discussing the effect of strategic holdups on bargaining between rightsholders and potential improvers in patent law). The discussion applies with equal force to negotiations over copyrights.
18
Any overinvestment in precautions is socially wasteful. See generally Guido
Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970).
19
Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years, 1954–1965 (Blackside, Inc. &
PBS Video 1986); Eyes on the Prize II: America at the Racial Crossroads, 1965–1985
(Blackside, Inc. & PBS Video 1990).
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police—had expired, and the cost of renewing the licenses was
prohibitively expensive.20
Yet even in cases where users elect to rely on fair use and proceed without permission from rightsholders, the practical pressures
of litigation often threaten to derail these efforts before fair use
rights can be vindicated in court. For example, Google recently
launched Google Book Search, which seeks to create a searchable
database containing the full text of every book in several major libraries (including those still under copyright protection). Several
groups have brought legal challenges against Google, alleging that
the project violates copyright law. Notwithstanding the fact that
the leading precedent supports the position that Google’s use is
fair,21 as well as the massive academic rallying behind the company,
it seems likely that Google will settle rather than take the cases to
trial.22
In this Essay, we explore the possibility of reforming fair use
through the recognition of certain types of copying as per se fair.
Uses that fall within these bounds would not give rise to liability
for copyright infringement, so actors who engage in them would be
categorically immune from suit. Carefully tailored, safe harbors
would provide much needed certainty to users and potential creators without unduly compromising the rights of current copyright
owners. Thus, the introduction of a bright-line rule component into

20
See Guy Dixon, How Copyright Could Be Killing Culture, Globe & Mail (Toronto), Jan. 17, 2005, at R1 (noting that the footage of protest marches and police
confrontations remain under copyright); Lisa Helem, Civil Rights: A Televised
Movement?, Newsweek, Feb. 14, 2005, at 8, 8 (noting that the footage of the Montgomery bus boycotts remains under copyright); see also Colleen Long, Documentary
Raises Copyright Issues, Cin. Post, Feb. 5, 2005, at A13 (noting that copyright clearance issues also prohibited the use of “[a] touching and intimate scene in the film
[that] shows staff members singing ‘Happy Birthday’ to Martin Luther King Jr. on his
39th, and last, birthday”). It now appears that, due to charitable contributions of approximately $850,000, PBS has been able to reacquire a license to broadcast the series. See Press Release, PBS News, Eyes on the Prize, Produced by Blackside, Returns
to
PBS
on
American
Experience
(Jan.
14,
2006),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/aboutpbs/news/20060114_eyesontheprize.html.
21
See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the reproduction of copyrighted works for use as thumbnails in a search engine is a
fair use under the Copyright Act).
22
See Jeffrey Toobin, Google’s Moon Shot, New Yorker, Feb. 5, 2007, at 30, 30.
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the doctrine of fair use has the potential to significantly enhance
social welfare.23
Since copyright law is a balancing act, we recommend that policymakers err on the side of safety and adopt a minimalist approach
to crafting these new harbors. This can be achieved by setting fairly
restrictive limits that are tailored to each particular type of subject
matter. To illustrate, permissible reproduction may include the following: for literary works, three hundred words or fewer (and in no
case more than fifteen percent of the copyrighted work); for sound
recordings, ten seconds or less (and in no case more than ten percent of the copyrighted work); and for films and audiovisual works,
thirty seconds or less (and in no case more than ten percent of the
copyrighted work).24 Uses that exceed these specified limits would
remain subject to the current multifactor fair use analysis. Thus,
even if our proposal were to be implemented, parodists would continue to be able to use a much greater amount of protected expression, as would certain highly transformative users.25 Its implementation would not diminish any free speech privileges,26 or otherwise
alter existing doctrines. It would simply establish supplementary
safe harbors that would shelter many users from expensive litigation and the vagaries of case-by-case decisionmaking.
Importantly, implementation of our proposal can salvage fair use
in the digital age. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, by prohibiting circumvention of technological protection measures,27
made fair use irrelevant with respect to the vast amount of protected expression stored in digital form. As many commentators
have observed, the legislation gave copyright owners an absolute

23

While fair use safe harbors found their way into the laws of Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom, they have never been a part of the law of the United States.
Moreover, they have received only scant attention from a handful of legal scholars
who have summarily rejected them. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing scholars who have rejected the notion of clarifying fair use with rules).
24
For a full discussion of the safe harbor limits, see infra Section II.C.
25
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 574–94 (1994).
26
But see Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that fair use in
its current form hampers free speech).
27
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
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veto over any fair uses of their works. 28 Previous efforts to recognize a fair use exception in this context have failed because there
was no ex ante way to differentiate circumvention of protective
measures for fair uses from circumvention for infringing ones. Accordingly, lawmakers feared that permitting circumvention for fair
uses would open the door for the lifting of works in their entirety.
This is a classic example of a pooling equilibrium.29 Our proposal
unties this Gordian knot by identifying fair uses ex ante. Thus,
Congress could require content providers to employ protective
technologies that enable end-users to access limited amounts of
protected material that fall within the safe harbors.
But what about copyright owners? At first glance, one might
think that our proposal could weaken the incentive to produce new
works. But a more careful examination suggests, counterintuitively,
that it may actually improve production. As Professor William
Landes and Judge Richard Posner have pointed out, if creators as a
group had had it their way, they would have chosen to limit copyright protection:30
[t]o the extent that a later author is free to borrow material from
an earlier one, the later author’s cost of expression is reduced;
and, from an ex ante viewpoint, every author is both an earlier
author from whom a later author might want to borrow material
31
and the later author himself.

Our proposal reduces both costs and risks for all creators. Thus, on
the whole, it may increase the number (as well as quality) of new
works.
One final objection may be that the benefits authors stand to
gain in terms of reduced cost would be outweighed by the losses
they stand to incur from unlicensed reproduction by members of
the general public who do not partake in creative activities. We do
not find this objection compelling for two reasons. First, the nar-

28
See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485,
527 (2004).
29
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 19–21 (2000) (describing pooling
equilibria in the law).
30
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 327 (1989).
31
Id. at 333.
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row tailoring of the per se fair uses makes them virtually valueless
for typical purchasers. Even illegal music downloaders are unlikely
to take advantage of our proposed ten second safe harbor as a
market substitute for entire songs.32 Second, as many commentators
have noted, digital technologies have blurred the traditional distinction between producers and users of expressive content.33 Today, a significant amount of content is user produced, and “remix”
is emerging as an important mode of production.34 We believe that
these technological and cultural changes underscore the need to reform fair use along the lines of our proposal.
The remainder of the Essay unfolds in three parts. In Part I, we
demonstrate how fair use’s ambiguity upsets the balance underlying copyright law. In Part II, we present our proposal of nonexclusive safe harbors of fair use and examine the implications. In Part
III, we address potential objections and criticisms.
I. FAIR USE, UNCERTAINTY, AND OVERDETERRENCE
In this Part, we position fair use in the overall scheme of copyright law and explain its vital role in maintaining the delicate balance copyright law aims to achieve between promoting the creation
of new works and securing adequate access to existing ones. We
then explain how the vagueness of the fair use doctrine undermines
its utility, upsets copyright’s balance, and leads to the underuse of
protected expression.
A. Copyright’s Balance
Unlike other philosophical rationales for intellectual property
protection,35 the American model views protecting authors’ rights
not as an end unto itself, but rather as a means—specifically, the
32

For a discussion of ringtones, see infra notes 146–148 and accompanying text. As
to whether end-users might attempt to circumvent the law by reassembling entire
songs from ten second segments, see the discussion of strategic abuse in Section III.C.
33
See Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 951, 955–56 (2004) (discussing the ascent of user-based content).
34
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Creative Economies, 1 Mich. St. L. Rev 33, 35 (2006)
(characterizing culture and knowledge as remix).
35
See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287
(1988) (discussing the leading philosophical justifications for intellectual property protection).
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means to produce a more robust intellectual and artistic culture.36
On this view, copyright protection is necessary to remedy an underproduction problem that arises from the “public good” nature
of expressive works.37 Unlike tangible goods, public goods share
two distinctive characteristics: nonrivalry of consumption and nonexcludability of benefits.38 A good is nonrivalrous in consumption if
a unit of that good can be consumed by one person without diminishing the consumption opportunities available to others from that
same unit.39 A good displays nonexcludable benefits if individuals
who have not paid for the production of that good cannot be prevented at a reasonable cost from availing themselves of its benefits.40 The nonexcludability property of public goods gives rise to
two related problems. First, public goods are likely to be underproduced if left to the private market. Second, markets for public
goods will not form. Since expressive works are essentially information goods, they too are susceptible to the twin problems of underproduction and lack of market exchange.41 Given that the cost
of creating a new expressive work is generally high and the cost of
copying that work is generally low, without copyright protection
original creators would be reluctant to invest in the creation of new
works. Unauthorized reproduction of successful expressive works
and inventions would drive the market price down to the point
where original authors would not be able to recover their initial
expenditures. Although the original authors would still retain cer-

36
This is evident from the intellectual property clause in the Constitution that empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37
See, e.g., Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Perez, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 Int’l
Rev. L. & Econ. 209, 218 (1985); Gordon, supra note 15, at 1610; Landes & Posner,
supra note 30, at 326.
38
See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 46–48 (1st ed.
1988); Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods,
and Club Goods 6–7 (1986); Edwin Mansfield, Principles of Macroeconomics 400–04
(6th ed. 1989).
39
See Cornes & Sandler, supra note 38, at 6.
40
See id. at 160; see also Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 631, 632 (1993).
41
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 19–20 (2003).
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tain advantages (such as lead time and claims to authenticity),42 in
many cases those would be insufficient to allow creators to recoup
their initial investment, let alone make a profit.43 As a result, there
would be a suboptimal level of production of creative works.44 By
creating and protecting exclusive rights in expressive works of authorship, copyright law assures authors adequate return on their
investment in the creation of new works.
Securing adequate returns for authors, however, is not the primary purpose of copyright law. As is clear from the intellectual
property clause of the Constitution, the Framers’ ultimate goal was
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”45 The grant
of limited exclusive rights to authors is the means selected for
achieving this end,46 but the end itself is the wide dissemination of
works after their creation47 and the promotion of learning.48
42
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 299–302
(1970) (discussing the competitive advantages authors would retain even in the absence of copyright protection).
43
See, e.g., Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection
for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. Rev. 1100, 1108–13
(1971) (addressing the “difficulties with the economic argument for [the] abolition of
copyright protection for published books”); see also Carla Hesse, Publishing and Cultural Politics in Revolutionary Paris, 1789–1810 (1991) (detailing the harm caused to
the publishing industry by the elimination of copyright protection in the wake of the
French Revolution).
44
See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 138–44 (2004)
(discussing the social value of information and the optimal level of its production).
45
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46
See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 Geo.
L.J. 1771 (2006) (positing that the promotion of science and useful art is a limitation
on Congress’s power to enact intellectual property laws); Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1, 19–20 (2002) (discussing the means-end structure of the intellectual property
clause); Kevin A. Goldman, Comment, Limited Times: Rethinking the Bounds of
Copyright Protection, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 705, 739 (2006).
47
See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); see also Jane C. Ginsburg,
Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection in Works of Information, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1873 (1990) (“[T]he 1710 English Statute of Anne, the 1787
United States Constitution, and the 1790 United States federal copyright statute all
characterized copyright as a device to promote the advancement of knowledge.”).
48
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261–62 (11th Cir.
2001) (noting that the copyright scheme is designed to promote learning).
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Accordingly, copyright law must perform a balancing act. If protection is too weak, a suboptimal amount of intellectual work will be produced. If protection is too strong, the public will not receive the full
intended benefit from works after their creation. In either case, future
authors may be deprived of sources from which they can draw to
build new works (either because the materials do not exist or because
they are unable to make reasonable appropriations). Thus, when the
cycle is out of balance, the public as a whole is the ultimate loser.
In order to ensure adequate provision of expressive works, Congress provided creators with the exclusive rights to reproduce,
adapt, distribute, display, perform, and digitally perform49 their
works, as well as any works that are “substantially similar.”50 Together, these legally enforceable rights ensure that content producers can capitalize on the value of their creative output, thus providing a substantial incentive to create new works.
At the same time, in order to protect the public interest in accessing and using works once they have been created and to ensure
that excessively strong copyright protection does not thwart the
very creativity it seeks to promote,51 the rights of authors are restricted in three important ways: First, certain subjects, such as
ideas, are outside the realm of protection entirely.52 Second, the duration of protection is limited.53 And third, there is a fair use privilege that permits, under certain circumstances, the unlicensed reproduction of protected expression.54

49

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Although the circuit courts have articulated several variations of the infringement
inquiry, they are generally unified in holding that infringement hinges not on a finding
of precise or exact copying, but rather on a finding that some manner of copying did
occur, that the material actually copied was protected by copyright, and that the
amount of copying was “substantial.” See Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as
Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 1187, 1188–89 (1990).
51
Cf. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 11 (analyzing the manner in which the inability of intellectual property owners to capture the full value of their works encourages greater innovation and increases social welfare).
52
See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100–01 (1879) (establishing the
idea/expression dichotomy); Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(discussing the Scènes à Faire doctrine).
53
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–305.
54
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
50
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B. Fair Use as a Balancing Tool
Fair use is perhaps the most crucial policy tool for maintaining
copyright’s intended balance. The doctrine legitimizes certain reproductions of copyrighted expression that would otherwise constitute copyright infringement. In Hohfeldian terms, the doctrine
grants the public a privilege55 “to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without [the owner’s] consent.”56
This reasonableness inquiry has historically been, and still remains, the essence of the fair use doctrine.57 When Congress codified the doctrine in 1976, it refrained from defining fair use or articulating a clear test of fairness.58 Instead, it provided a
nonexhaustive list of illustrative uses—such as comment, criticism,
scholarship, research, news reporting, and teaching—that may
qualify as fair. Then, in keeping with prior doctrine, it enumerated
four nonexclusive factors to be considered by courts in deciding
whether a particular use is fair. These four factors are
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
59
the copyrighted work.
55

See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 30 (1913) (distinguishing rights from
privileges); see also David R. Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty
Under U.S. Copyright Law, 52 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 345, 368–70 (2005) (employing Hohfeld’s framework to analyze the fair use doctrine).
56
Horace G. Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944) (emphasis added).
57
When Justice Story first laid the groundwork for the doctrine’s importation into
American law in Folsom v. Marsh, he consciously followed the English model, eschewing any inquiry into the public interest and focusing solely on whether the defendant’s use was, on its own terms, “fair.” 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4901).
58
See Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 Legal
Theory 347, 352 (1997) (discussing the interpretive problems arising from the statutory text).
59
17 U.S.C. § 107.
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Congress provided no guidance as to how to measure these factors against one another, whether all must be satisfied for a finding
of fair use, or how conflicts among them are to be reconciled. Instead, Congress simply instructed the courts that “each case raising
the question must be decided on its own facts.”60 As a result, the
doctrine has become a catch-all exception to copyright protection.61
To be sure, courts have attempted to define fair use and make
sense of its objectives, but these efforts have failed unconditionally.
The judicial path of fair use is paved with split courts, reversed decisions, and inconsistent opinions.62 The hope that a common understanding would emerge over time did not materialize.63 This was
not the intended state of affairs. As Justice Kennedy has noted,
“The common-law method instated by the fair use provision of the
copyright statute . . . presumes that rules will emerge from the
course of decisions.”64 Yet just the opposite has occurred: the repeated application of the fair use doctrine has resulted in it growing increasingly unpredictable.
Academics, for their part, have been unable to rescue fair use
from its murkiness. Despite numerous attempts to distill a coherent
conception, none of these formulations has been adopted by the
courts, and scholars generally agree that it is now virtually impossible to predict the outcome of fair use cases.65
Moreover, as Professor Polk Wagner has observed, this ambiguity creates a negative feedback loop: faced with the increasingly
60

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform,
23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 391, 402 (2005) (“The substantive emptiness of fair use
makes it something of a dumping ground for copyright analysis that courts can’t manage in other areas.”).
62
See Parchomovsky, supra note 58, at 348 n.7 (demonstrating this point by reviewing the case law).
63
Leval, supra note 5, at 1105–06.
64
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
65
See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public
Values, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 423, 426–27 (2005) (“[E]ven at [a high] level of generality, there is little more that can be usefully said about the division between fair and
unfair uses in practice: The ‘know it when you see it’ nature of the analytic approach
in this context simply precludes such observations.”); see also David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 263, 278–84 (employing a statistical analysis to demonstrate the
unpredictability of the fair use doctrine).
61
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unpredictable nature of the doctrine, both copyright owners and
content users perceive a loss of their rights and respond by making
ever-broadening claims, with content owners claiming more in the
way of exclusive rights, and content users claiming more in the way
of fair use rights.66 This, of course, only feeds back into the cycle,
increasing each side’s perception of loss and exacerbating the doctrine’s uncertainty.67
C. Uncertainty and Its Cost
To fully understand the harm caused by the overdeterrence of
fair use, it is useful to view the doctrine within the larger legal context. U.S. copyright law ostensibly establishes a standard of strict
liability; the mental state of a putative infringer is irrelevant to the
issue of direct liability.68 Courts have interpreted liability under the
Copyright Act very broadly, ruling that it requires neither intent
nor knowledge, thus making even unconscious copying actionable.69
A closer inspection, however, reveals that the “strict liability”
view is inaccurate: it ignores the role that fair use plays in transforming copyright law into a negligence-type regime. Just as a negligence standard imposes liability on individuals for deviating from
socially optimal standards of behavior and absolves from liability
injurers who invest in reasonable precautions,70 fair use protects users whose appropriations fall within a socially beneficial range.
Consequently, fair use, like the negligence analysis in tort law, attempts to guide behavior by punishing only those who deviate from
the socially optimal standard.
No clear understanding of the socially optimal standard has
emerged, however, rendering fair use largely unknowable and unpredictable. This comes at a high cost: law and economics scholars
66

Wagner, supra note 65, at 427–28.
Id. at 428–29.
68
Mental state remains relevant to the issue of secondary liability. See MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (“One infringes
contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a
right to stop or limit it.” (citations omitted)).
69
See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
70
Shavell, supra note 44, at 180.
67
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have long observed that vague standards cause overdeterrence.
Under negligence-type standards, suboptimal investment in precautions leads to full liability whereas optimal investment results in
no liability. But the vagueness of the fair use standard prevents actors from precisely discerning the optimal level of investment. As a
result, actors find it in their best interest to err on the side of safety
and either overcomply (by minimizing the use of protected works)
or overinvest in precautions.
In the copyright context, the problem of overdeterrence is aggravated by several factors. First, due to their public good characteristics, expressive works invariably generate spillovers (or positive externalities).71 Consequently, users of copyrighted material
cannot capture the full benefit of the use but stand to bear the full
cost if sued. Second, the Copyright Act provides a wide array of
remedies to copyright owners, including injunctions and supercompensatory damages. Courts can order the impounding of infringing articles,72 allow plaintiffs the defendants’ profits,73 or award
statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work infringed willfully.74
This means that the expected cost faced by unauthorized users is
likely to far exceed the expected, often quite modest, benefit.
Given this disparity, users are unlikely to engage in fair use, and
even in cases where authors are motivated by ideological reasons
to take a chance on fair use, their publishers and distributors are
likely to oppose the idea. For these gatekeepers, the relatively
small reward simply does not justify incurring such substantial
risk.75
71
See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property
and the Mythologies of Control, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 995 (2003) (explaining why copyrighted information can never be fully appropriated and assessing the implications of
this fact for policymaking).
72
17 U.S.C. § 503 (2000).
73
17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
74
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). If the infringement is not willful, the maximum amount a
plaintiff can collect is $30,000. § 504(c)(1).
75
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 26, at 583–84 (“It should be no surprise that publishers thus require permission for even brief quotations . . . .”). In addition to fear of
costly litigation, there is a secondary element of self-interest, as these same publishers
profit when follow-on artists choose to pay licensing fees to use their works. See Kate
O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from the Right of
First Publication, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 369, 401 (2001) (noting that “holders of substantial
copyright interests have an incentive to narrow the scope of fair use, establish a cus-
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To protect against the uncertainty of fair use, the only alternative to not using the copyrighted content is to secure a license from
the rightsholder. But the licensing option is fraught with problems
of its own. In an important recent article, Professor James Gibson
demonstrates how the vagueness of intellectual property doctrines,
including fair use, forces users to secure licenses even when they do
not necessarily need to do so and how this dynamic enables rightsholders to expand their rights at the expense of users and the public.76
Additionally, securing an unnecessary license is a wasteful expenditure of resources that could be directed to other, more creative, ends. The purpose of fair use, after all, is to spare users from
these costs by giving them the privilege to use some protected expression for free.
More importantly, perhaps, licensing fails to provide a solution
for cases involving high transaction costs, strategic holdups, and
unconscious or inadvertent copying. We discuss each of these cases
in order.
The connection between fair use and high transaction costs was
established by Professor Wendy Gordon. She pointed out that in
certain settings, the cost of negotiating a license exceeds the value
of the use for the user.77 For example, if a user values a certain line
from Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude at
ten dollars and the cost of negotiating with HarperCollins Publishers (the relevant rightsholder) is fifteen dollars, no deal will be
consummated between the parties, even if HarperCollins’s asking
price is lower than the user’s reserve price. More generally, when
the cost of transacting exceeds a user’s reserve price, no voluntary
transactions will occur. Such cases are natural contenders for a fair
use finding. Allowing the user to reproduce the protected expression improves her utility without diminishing the utility of the
rightsholder.
Of course, transaction costs are not static. The rise of the Internet and the advent of digital platforms, together with the developtom of requiring permission for rights owned, earn revenue, and create a measure of
market impact should they wish to challenge unlicensed uses of materials for which
they hold the copyright”).
76
Gibson, supra note 16.
77
Gordon, supra note 15, at 1608.
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ment of copyright clearance agencies,78 have reduced many of the
transaction costs that previously stood as barriers to cost-effective
bargaining.79
Even so, transaction costs remain high in many settings, especially when a user needs to clear multiple copyrights in order to
distribute a new work. Content users, such as documentary filmmakers who find themselves unable to secure licenses for any protected works that appear in their film, are then left with something
of a Hobson’s choice: they must either obscure the copyrighted material and thereby ‘falsify’ the ‘reality’ of the scene, or eliminate the
scene in its entirety.80 Thus, the Eyes on the Prize series could not
be broadcast or sold for over a decade,81 and Alex Gibney’s documentary Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room82 was released
without several historically valuable short clips in the final cut of
the film.83 It should be emphasized, however, that even when only
one protected work is involved, transaction costs may thwart bargaining if the user places relatively little value on the use and the
rightsholder cannot be readily ascertained or fails to take advantage of digital negotiation platforms.
Strategic bargaining by rightsholders may also get in the way of
licensing. Rightsholders, in attempting to extract the lion’s share of
the bargaining surplus, may overestimate the value of the license
for users and demand excessive licensing fees. For example, many
organizations that hold the copyrights to historically significant
photographs and film footage traditionally licensed their use at little or no cost. Today, however, they are more likely to view the
78
See Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 295
(2003) (“As transaction costs drop through a combination of institutional arrangements such as the Copyright Clearance Center, and as the internet creates a ubiquitous structure for micro-transactions—microconsents with micropayments—fair use
might cease to play a meaningful role.”).
79
See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557, 564–67 (1998).
80
See Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2005, at
C13. See generally Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers (2004), available
at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf.
81
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
82
Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Jigsaw Productions 2005).
83
See Elaine Dutka, Copyright Isn’t the Last Word, L.A. Times, Nov. 18, 2005, at 16.
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works as any other commodity and require much higher licensing
fees.84
The problem is not limited to historic material. Professors Adam
Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff approached the Rolling Stones
for permission to open a chapter in their book on game theory with
the line “What’s confusing you is the nature of my game.”85 The
Stones, or more precisely their rights agent, showed no sympathy
(devilish or otherwise) for the request and demanded $10,000 for
the right to use the line. Even though the authors believed they had
a strong claim for fair use, they opted to publish the book without
the quotation.86
Rightsholders may also refuse to license on ideological grounds.
As Professor Rebecca Tushnet reports, “Numerous scholars have
been denied permission to quote or reprint pictures on the basis of
copyright owners’ disagreement with their interpretations, and fair
use is no help to such scholars if publishers refuse to rely on the
uncertain doctrine.”87
Finally, licensing is not a viable solution for users who unconsciously or inadvertently reproduce small amounts of copyrighted
expression. As the case of Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs
Music, Ltd. demonstrates, creators may subconsciously rely on
copyrighted content in creating a new work without realizing it.88
Furthermore, users may incorporate copyrighted expression into
new works based on an erroneous understanding of the law.89 In
addition, users may sometimes inadvertently reproduce protected
expression, for example, by capturing a copyrighted poster in the
background of a film. Since such users are not even aware that
their activities are unlawful, they will not seek to license any rights.
84

See Dixon, supra note 20, at R1.
Email from Barry Nalebuff, Milton Steinbach Professor of Management, Yale
School of Management, to Gideon Parchomovsky, Professor of Law, University of
Pennsylvania Law School (Feb. 20, 2007, 14:57:20 EST) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
86
Id.
87
Tushnet, supra note 26, at 585.
88
420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
89
See, e.g., Lipton v. The Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); U.S. Payphone v.
Executives Unlimited of Durham, No. 89-1081, 1991 WL 64957, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr.
29, 1991); see also R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in Copyright Law 7–17
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (discussing the copying of works believed to be in the public domain).
85
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Yet even minimal amounts of copying can lead to costly and drawn
out litigation.
II. SAFE HARBORS OF FAIR USE
In this Part, we discuss a way to increase clarity and certainty for
users of copyrighted works by enacting clearly defined, nonexclusive fair use safe harbors. Uses that fall within these harbors would
be considered per se fair. Uses that fall outside of them would continue to be analyzed under existing doctrine. Drawing on limited
past experiences, we advance a specific proposal for enacting nonexclusive fair use harbors and demonstrate how it may be defined
and implemented. We then show how our proposal may salvage
fair use with respect to digital rights, so as to further fair use interests.
A. Introducing Rules into Copyright Law
Legal norms are generally expressed as either standards or
rules.90 A classic illustration of a standard is “drive safely,” whereas
an oft-cited example of a rule is “drive 55 miles per hour or less.”91
Standards are relatively easy to promulgate and provide judges
with considerable discretion.92 Yet this discretion provides no ex
ante certainty93 and allows for potentially inconsistent decisions,
making future applications of the standard difficult to predict.94
Rules, on the other hand, generally are more costly to promulgate, and their enforcement can often seem arbitrary and harsh.95
They typically provide little or no flexibility to judges, and their
application may lead to inequitable results in individual cases.
However, the rigidity of rules provides substantial clarity and pre-

90
See generally Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1992); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Pierre J. Schlag,
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with
Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953 (1995).
91
See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 90, at 560.
92
See, e.g., id. at 564–65.
93
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 90, at 976.
94
See, e.g., id.
95
See, e.g., id. at 995–96 (noting that “[r]ules [c]an [b]e [d]ehumanizing and
[p]rocedurally [u]nfair”).
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dictability, informing the public how to behave in order to comply
with the legal norm.96
Intellectual property law relies heavily on numerous vague standards, most notably fair use. The harm that flows from this ambiguity has prompted some scholars to call for the introduction of rules
in this area in order to increase certainty.97 Numerous other scholars, though, have expressed skepticism at the idea of clarifying fair
use with rules, arguing that a flexible, muddy standard is necessary
to protect the public’s interest and maintain copyright’s balance.98
Notwithstanding the academic opposition, there have been several
attempts to enact safe harbors for copyright users. The next Section examines the successes and failures of these efforts.
B. Previous Attempts to Create Rules for Fair Use
Given the uncertainty of the current fair use doctrine, it is not surprising that there have been several attempts to establish a clearer
understanding of the doctrine’s contours. Those attempts provide a
96

See, e.g., id. at 976–77.
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 26, at 588 (“[T]he law might limit what counts as
sufficient copying to constitute reproduction or creation of a derivative work, so that
activities such as sampling and quoting would clearly be noninfringing.”). Tushnet,
however, also suggests that “there is no way to know in advance how much copying is
too much.” Id. We disagree with that assertion—at a low enough threshold, it is possible to make that determination ex ante. See also Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture 295
(2004) (advocating for clearer and narrower lines demarcating the scope of protection
for derivative works); Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 87, 151–
52 (2004) (suggesting that the Copyright Office could be given the regulatory authority to promulgate rules and safe harbors).
98
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 121, 140
(1999) (“[F]air use appears to be employed in situations of high transaction costs,
where a muddy entitlement may be appropriate. . . . The ‘muddy’ four-part balancing
standard of fair use allows courts to reallocate what the market cannot.”); Michael W.
Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1087, 1147 (2007) (arguing that rules for fair
use would lack sufficient context-sensitivity); Madison, supra note 61, at 396 (“Since
the complexity of the copyright statute already compares unfavorably to the tax code,
it seems unwise to ‘solve’ fair use by adding more details to the statute.”); Matthew
Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 381, 435 (2005) (arguing that a flexible fair
use standard is needed to allow courts to adapt copyright protection to new innovations); see also Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11
J.L. Econ. & Org. 256, 257 (1995) (“When the parties bargain over the entitlement
when there is private information about value and harm, bargaining may be more efficient under a blurry balancing test than under a certain rule.”).
97
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valuable reference point for our analysis and allow us to draw on the
mistakes and successes of the past in designing our proposed system.
1. Libraries—From a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” to Section 108
The so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 193599 was the earliest attempt to create a fair use safe harbor. Enacted in response to
the advent of microfilm and photo-duplication technology,100 the
agreement was negotiated between the Joint Committee on Materials for Research (on behalf of libraries and their patrons) and the
National Association of Book Publishers. It permitted libraries,
museums, and similar institutions to reproduce, under a carefully
specified set of circumstances, part of a copyright-protected work
for scholarly purposes, so long as the copy was not produced for a
profit and the recipient was notified that she was still bound by applicable copyright law regarding her use of the material.101
Although this agreement did not have the force of law, it was
nevertheless consistently honored by both libraries and publishers.102
Moreover, when a publisher did attempt to challenge the practice,
the Court of Claims, in a decision affirmed by an equally divided
Supreme Court, held that the practice constituted fair use.103
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress codified a version of the
Gentlemen’s Agreement, providing several safe harbors for libraries to facilitate fair uses of protected materials.104 The Act allows a
library to make a single copy
of no more than one article or other contribution to a copyrighted collection or periodical issue, or [to make a single copy]
of a small part of any other copyrighted work, if—

99
The Gentlemen’s Agreement and the Problem of Copyright, 2 J. Documentary
Reprod. 29, 31–33 (1939).
100
See Peter Hirtle, Research, Libraries, and Fair Use: The Gentlemen’s Agreement
of 1935, 53 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 545, 545–46 (2006).
101
See The Gentlemen’s Agreement, supra note 99, at 31.
102
Randall Coyne, Rights of Reproduction and the Provision of Library Services, 13
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 485, 488–89 (1991).
103
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d
by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
104
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 108, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546–48 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 108 (2000)).
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(1) the copy or phonorecord becomes the property of the user,
and the library or archives has had no notice that the copy or
phonorecord would be used for any purpose other than private
study, scholarship, or research; and
(2) the library or archives displays prominently, at the place
where orders are accepted, and includes on its order form, a
warning of copyright in accordance with requirements that the
105
Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.

Although the statute is not a model of predictability—for example, it does not define what constitutes a “small part” of a protected work106—it has been effective at providing guidance for libraries and shielding them from liability.107 This safe harbor does
not provide any protection for end-users, however, leaving them
subject to the traditional four-factor analysis.108
2. The “Classroom Guidelines”
The most famous attempt to create a fair use safe harbor was the
establishment of guidelines for copying by teachers for classroom
use, commonly known as the “Classroom Guidelines.”109 These
105

Id. § 108(d).
See Hirtle, supra note 100, at 3–4 (noting that the amount of copying that would
be permissible was consciously left out of the discussion).
107
See, e.g., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, Whether and Under What
Circumstances Government Reproduction of Copyrighted Materials Is a Noninfringing “Fair Use” Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, at 15 (Apr. 30, 1999),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/pincusfinal430.htm (“If a certain library practice
is noninfringing under the specific and detailed provisions of section 108(a) (as confined by section 108(g)(2)), a library need not be concerned about how that particular
photocopying practice would fare under section 107’s more complex and indeterminate fair use standards.”).
108
See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“We do not deal with the question of copying by an individual, for personal use in
research or otherwise (not for resale), recognizing that under the fair use doctrine or
the de minimis doctrine, such a practice by an individual might well not constitute an
infringement.”).
109
See Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at
68–70 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681–83; see also Kenneth D.
Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 Ohio St. L.J.
599, 615–19 (2001) (discussing the “Classroom Guidelines”). Similar frameworks were
promulgated to address the copying of musical works and television broadcasts. See
Guidelines for Off-Air Recordings of Broadcast Programming for Educational Pur106
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rules were the product of negotiations between representatives of
educational institutions, authors, and publishers.110 While the terms
of the agreement were not incorporated into the statute itself, they
were included with the House Report accompanying the Act.111
Most notable among the Guidelines is the portion that seeks to
clarify the meaning of Section 107’s provision that “multiple copies
for classroom use” could constitute fair use by providing that
Multiple copies (not to exceed in any event more than one copy
per pupil in a course) may be made by or for the teacher giving
the course for classroom use or discussion; provided that:
A. The copying meets the tests of brevity and spontaneity as defined below; and,
B. Meets the cumulative effect test as defined below; and,
112

C. Each copy includes a notice of copyright[.]

The “brevity” requirement limits the number of words that may
be copied from a literary work.113 “Spontaneity” requires that the
decision to make a copy be sufficiently close in time to its educational use for “maximum teaching effectiveness” such that “it
would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for
permission.”114 Finally, the “cumulative effect test” limits the total
number of excerpts a teacher may make from a single author or
during a single class term.115
Although these Guidelines appear to be an improvement over a
traditional four-factor analysis, they fall short of constituting real
bright-line safe harbors.116 The problem lies in the fact that the

poses, H.R. Rep. No. 97-495, at 8–9 (1982); Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music,
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 70–71; see also Crews, supra, at 619–21 (discussing the
“Music Guidelines” and “Off-Air Videotaping Guidelines”).
110
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 67.
111
Id. at 67–70.
112
Id. at 68.
113
Id. at 68–69.
114
Id. at 69.
115
Id.
116
See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
§ 13.05[E][3][a] (4th ed. 2007); Crews, supra note 109, at 619 (“The guidelines may
well offer more certainty, but they still raise their own questions and pose their own
problems for application.”).
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Guidelines incorporate by reference murky standards that offset
any clarity provided by the rules. The brevity requirement, for example, allows for the copying of “a complete article, story or essay
of less than 2,500 words,” but a subsequent qualification excludes
from that group a vaguely defined class of “special works.”117
Similarly, the “spontaneity” rule does not provide a set amount
of time in which to use the copied work, but rather includes such
amorphous thresholds as the reasonability of expecting a timely
reply and “the moment of [a work’s] use for maximum teaching effectiveness.”118 The Guidelines, moreover, provide only vague prohibitions, such as “[c]opying shall not . . . substitute for the purchase of books, publishers’ reprints or periodicals.”119 These
embedded standards provide tremendous leeway for rightsholders
to claim that many types of copying fail to conform to the Guidelines.
Finally, the Guidelines do not have the force of law.120 Although
the House Judiciary Committee endorsed the Guidelines as “a reasonable interpretation of the minimum standards of fair use,”121
they cannot be relied upon with the same confidence as if they
were legally binding.122
Notwithstanding these shortcomings,123 the Guidelines seem to
be reasonably effective at providing traditional classroom teachers
with some ability to make educational use of copyrighted materi117
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–69 (defining special works as “[c]ertain works in
poetry, prose or in ‘poetic prose’ which often combine language with illustrations and
which are intended sometimes for children and at other times for a more general audience [and which] fall short of 2,500 words in their entirety”).
118
Id. at 69.
119
Id.
120
See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that the Guidelines are “instructive on the issue of fair use” but “not controlling on the court”).
121
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 72.
122
See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919 n.5 (2d Cir.
1994) (noting that the Guidelines are not binding and exist only as persuasive authority); Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(citing Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 116, at § 13.05[E][3][a], for the proposition
that “a use which is within the [Classroom] Guidelines may exceed fair use”).
123
For further academic criticisms, see Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 149, 159–63
(1998) (discussing numerous flaws in the Classroom Guidelines); Carol M. Silberberg,
Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 617,
636–39 (2001) (same).
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als. Their major failing seems to be that they offer the potential for
greater utility at the expense of predictability. Although the Classroom Guidelines set out to establish a minimum amount of use that
would be considered fair, rather than a maximum,124 the negotiators
aimed to set the threshold at something more akin to a middle
ground compromise, rather than a true minimum.125
3. The Family Movie Act
With the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005,
Congress created a technologically sophisticated exception to
copyright infringement, and one that also differs philosophically
from the two safe harbors discussed above.126 In response to parental concern about objectionable content, several media companies began offering to edit lawfully acquired copies of movies
by removing content such as nudity and profanity.127 Shortly
thereafter, different entrepreneurs developed systems that would
program DVD players to automatically make similar changes
while a film was being played, by skipping certain scenes128 or
lowering the volume over particular pieces of dialogue. After the
Directors Guild of America inadvertently posted a press release
indicating their intention to sue over these practices,129 a consortium of companies filed for a declaratory judgment that these ed-

124
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68 (“The purpose of the following guidelines is to
state the minimum standards of educational fair use under Section 107 . . . .”).
125
The two main criticisms levied against the Guidelines are that they are too restrictive and too unpredictable. See Bartow, supra note 123, at 162–63. In practice, of
course, greater predictability would likely require greater restrictions, while less restrictive rules probably would be accompanied by less predictability.
126
Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218.
127
See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Utah Shop Offers Popular Videos with the Sex and
Violence Excised, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 2001, at A11.
128
See, e.g., Rick Lyman, Hollywood Balks at High-Tech Sanitizers: Some Video
Customers Want Tamer Films, and Entrepreneurs Rush to Comply, N.Y. Times, Sept.
19, 2002, at E1.
129
See Press Release, Directors Guild of America, DGA Files Lawsuit Against Entities
that Provide Unauthorized Altered Versions of Videocassettes and/or DVDs (Aug. 20,
2002), http://www.viewerfreedom.org/legal/20020820DGA/DGAfileslawsuit.PDF; see also
Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶¶ 16–17, Clean Flicks of Colo., L.L.C.
v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (No. 02-M-1662).
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iting practices were protected by the first sale130 and fair use doctrines.131
While the case was being litigated, Congress stepped in with the
Family Movie Act of 2005 (“FMA”),132 which created an explicit
exception to copyright infringement for the practices at issue.133
The law essentially acts as a bright-line safe harbor and was sufficiently clear to halt the extant litigation.134 Moreover, the FMA
represents a significant evolutionary step up from the Classroom
Guidelines and the Gentlemen’s Agreement because it allows content users to creatively alter protected works.135
Although it is probably too soon to make a definitive evaluation
of the FMA’s effectiveness as a safe harbor, the statute appears to
have substantially improved both clarity and predictability in this
one particular area, reinforcing the notion that sufficiently detailed
and precise rules can be valuable additions to the current fair use
framework.
4. Summary
Taken together, the above examples provide several reasons to
be optimistic that new safe harbors, if properly crafted, would be
both palatable and effective at improving the current copyright
scheme. Although our proposal differs from these examples in several important regards, incorporating the lessons of the past is crucial to any plan going forward. The Gentlemen’s Agreement has
130

The first sale doctrine distinguishes the rights to a copyrighted work from the
rights to an embodiment of that work. Once someone lawfully acquires a book, for
example, she may resell that copy without violating the copyright holder’s exclusive
right to distribute the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
131
See Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 129, at ¶ 15
(“Plaintiffs disagree that their third party editing of commercial movies violates any
trademark or copyright laws and believe that their actions set forth above are free
speech and/or fair use and are protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”).
132
The FMA was passed as Title II of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 167, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24.
133
See id. § 202(a)(3), 119 Stat. at 222.
134
Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240, 1243.
135
This also distinguishes the FMA from the statutory license that permits cover versions of songs. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). While the license requires that “the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work,”
id., the FMA contains no such limitation; indeed, it is rooted in protecting a behavior
designed to change a work’s fundamental character.
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been largely successful because it balances the needs of both copyright owners and content users by allowing copying that is broad
enough to be useful but still limited so as to protect the market for
the original work. The Classroom Guidelines follow a similar
model but have been less successful because, in trying to allow
maximally useful copying, the broad scope necessitated the incorporation of corresponding checks against abuse, leading to decreased predictability. Finally, the FMA seems to strike an ideal
balance, clearly delineating the scope of acceptable modification
while ensuring that the commercial vitality of the original work is
not diminished.
Essentially, these earlier forays into fair use safe harbors suggest
that the core principle—fairness—is not so inscrutable or elusive as
to render bright-line rules impracticable. To the contrary, these
case studies reveal that clearly defined and narrowly tailored safe
harbors promote productive uses of protected materials that would
otherwise be chilled, thereby pushing the copyright scheme closer
to its optimal balance.
C. Creating the Rules
The lessons of the past give rise to several design principles.
First, copyright owners and content users seem unlikely to ever
reach a negotiated agreement on their own, even as to minimal
safe harbors of fair use. Even though both groups would be made
better off by the implementation of clarifying rules, unilateral action by Congress (or a designated rulemaking body) will be necessary to enact a system of fair use harbors.
Second, for the safe harbors to be effective at facilitating fair
use, they must be clear and predictable. This means employing
bright-line rules that are free from any offsetting standards.
Third, it is important to adopt a minimalist approach to the design of the safe harbors. That is, the safe harbors should protect
appropriations of relatively small amounts of expression.
Fourth, the safe harbors must apply to end-users, rather than just
to intermediaries. Although content users often depend on libraries and other third parties to make certain materials available, it is
important that the safe harbors shield all parties seeking to make
fair use of protected materials.
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Consistent with the above observations, our proposed safe harbors seek to eliminate uncertainty wherever possible. Furthermore,
they are intended to be nonexclusive additions to the current
framework. Uses that fall outside of a harbor would not necessarily
lead to liability; they would simply require a traditional four-factor
analysis.
As is the case with any legal rule, one may take issue with the
specific limitations we suggest. Virtually all rules display a certain
level of arbitrariness. Reasonable people may disagree about the
specifics of speed limits, tax rates, and building codes. Yet those
rules remain highly effective in guiding and promoting efficient behavior. Furthermore, the level of arbitrariness under our proposed
scheme would in any event be lower than that of the current fair
use regime.
1. Literary Works
Scholars and judges have identified the practice of copying a
brief quotation as perhaps the clearest example of fair use in the
case law. Nevertheless, a belief persists that even for a small snippet of a literary work, a license is required.136
We propose that for any literary work consisting of at least one
hundred words, the lesser of fifteen percent or three hundred
words may be copied without the permission of the copyright
holder. The words need not appear consecutively (either in the
original or in the copy), so long as the total number of duplicated
words does not exceed the threshold.137

136

Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 216 n.16.
For example, Dr. Seuss famously wrote Green Eggs and Ham using only fifty different words. See Louis Menand, Cat People: What Dr. Seuss Really Taught Us, New
Yorker, Dec. 23 & 30, 2002, at 148, 152. While an end-user might be permitted to
copy all fifty different words, and even to repeatedly use those words in varying combinations, an attempt to assemble those words into a recreation of the original work in
excess of three hundred words would clearly exceed the safe harbor threshold. Cf.
Jorge Luis Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote, in Ficciones 29, 32 (Anthony Bonner & Emecé Editores trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1993) (1939) (describing a fictional author’s attempt to independently conceive and write a novel that mimics, word for word, the text of Miguel de Cervantes’s Don Quixote).
137
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One can quibble, of course, with where the threshold is drawn,138
but the more important point here is simply to be precise and predictable. So long as a user stays within the prescribed limits, she is
safe from claims of infringement and the need to face the uncertainties of the current four-factor analysis.
Previous safe harbors have avoided placing any minimum size
restriction on the work being copied.139 We have rejected such a
formulation to avoid the scale problem that plagued the Classroom
Guidelines and required the inclusion of the vague and confusing
“special works” exception.140 Instead, we simply exclude from the
safe harbor appropriations from any works shorter than one hundred words. This means that the safe harbor will be inapplicable to
some forms of artistic expression, such as haiku141 and other short
poems. While in the future it might be possible to create additional
safe harbors specifically tailored to those types of works, we do not
attempt to do so here, choosing instead to focus on a single exception for all literary works in order to emphasize both simplicity and
predictability.
2. Sound Recordings and Musical Compositions
As for sound recordings, we propose that the lesser of ten percent or ten seconds may be copied without permission. The portions borrowed need not be consecutive, so long as the cumulative
amount does not exceed the safe harbor. In order for this safe harbor to be clear and predictable, there should be no restrictions on
the types of uses that end-users may make. Moreover, this harbor
must extend to any musical composition underlying a ten-second
138

We selected the lower bound—fifteen percent of a one-hundred-word work—to
correspond roughly to two lines from a sonnet and the upper bound—three hundred
words from a longer piece—to capture passages approximately the size of Hamlet’s
“To be or not to be” soliloquy. See William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark
act 3, sc. 1.
139
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 67–70 (1976) (discussing the Agreement on
Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680–83; Bruce A. Lehman, U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, The Conference on Fair Use: Final Report to the Commissioner
on the Conclusion of the Conference on Fair Use § 4.2.1, at 53 (1998).
140
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 69.
141
For a discussion of the applicability of fair use to haiku, see Posting of David A.
Giacalone to f/k/a, Haiku and the Fair Use Doctrine, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
ethicalesq/haiku-and-the-fair-use-doctrine/ (Jan. 16, 2004, 16:57 EST).
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sound recording, with an important caveat: just as an end-user can
take no more than ten seconds from a single recording, she can
take no more than ten seconds embodying any particular musical
composition.142
At the same time, though, this safe harbor could allow for the
recreation of more than ten seconds of a work that itself incorporates protected material. Take, for example, Eminem’s “Stan,”143
which heavily samples Dido’s “Thank You.”144 An artist would be
free to take ten seconds from “Thank You” as well as ten seconds
from “Stan,” so long as the ten seconds taken from “Stan” did not
also contain any portion of the “Thank You” sound recording.
Placing the two portions back-to-back might theoretically replicate
twenty seconds of “Stan,” yet the work would remain within the
safe harbor.
This aspect of the safe harbor has some interesting implications
for collage. Take the case of a collage artist, who assembles a string
of ten-second clips from ten different sound recordings. Could
anyone copy that entire one-hundred-second work and fall within
the safe harbor? The answer is no. The key is to realize that these
ten-second clips should be treated like public domain materials:
there is no copyright protection in them individually, but someone
who assembles them nevertheless maintains copyright protection in
their selection and arrangement.145
This proposal would shift the established order far more than
the literary works proposal. In the absence of a fair use exception,
the music sampling market has grown more sophisticated,146 and
142
For example, one might wish to contrast the studio recording of “Maggie’s Farm”
that Bob Dylan released on Bringing It All Back Home (Columbia Records 1965),
with the faster, more controversial version performed that year at the Newport Music
Festival (and captured by Martin Scorsese in the documentary No Direction Home
(Paramount Pictures 2005)). Under the safe harbor, one could copy five seconds from
each, or any other combination of the two, so long as the finished work contained no
more than ten total seconds worth of appropriation embodying the “Maggie’s Farm”
musical composition.
143
Eminem, Stan, on The Marshall Mathers LP (Interscope Records 2000).
144
Dido, Thank You, on Sliding Doors: Music from the Motion Picture (MCA 1998).
145
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2000); see also Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1991); Key Publ’ns v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d
509, 514–16 (2d Cir. 1991).
146
David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 Berkeley Tech.
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ringtones for cellular phones have become a substantial source of
revenue for the record labels.147 Yet it does not appear that protecting these short samples is necessary to foster the creation of new
musical works. To the contrary, their dissemination appears to aid
musical sales.148
Nevertheless, we are cognizant of the fact that this aspect of our
proposal is likely to meet substantial resistance, and so we note
that it could be modified to protect ringtones by incorporating a
second baseline, such that the safe harbor would not apply to new
musical works that consist of more than ten percent copied material. This would significantly limit the safe harbor’s utility for collage artists and music samplers, but it would substantially reduce
the viability of safe harbor works as market substitutes for ringtones.
3. Audiovisual Works (I)
For audiovisual works, we propose a safe harbor that would allow users to reproduce the lesser of ten percent or thirty seconds of
any protected work.149 The nature of this medium necessitates certain restrictions. Without any limitations, one could take, say, an
image of Mickey Mouse from a single frame of Fantasia,150 transfer
it onto T-shirts or hats, and directly compete with Disney’s clothing
line. For this reason, we propose limiting the safe harbor to appropriations into other audiovisual works. Thus, an artist could take

L.J. 1685, 1743 (2005) (“The music sampling market is beginning to mature as licensing terms become standardized and royalty-free sample content fills a market
niche.”).
147
In 2005, for example, sales of ringtones in the United States exceeded $600 million. Jeff Leeds, The Loudest Ringtone: Hello? It’s 50 Cent Calling Collect, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 25, 2005, at AR2.
148
Paul R. La Monica, Ringtones: The Sound of Money, CNNMoney.com, Apr. 12,
2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/04/12/commentary/mediabiz/ (“[M]usic executives
say that ringtones serve as a marketing tool that can help lift sales of singles and albums.”).
149
While some might argue with this amount on the grounds that copying thirty seconds from a film could, for example, reveal a major plot twist, we do not find this concern compelling, as critics already have the ability to act as “spoilers” under the current framework. See, e.g., Michael Blowen, The Bickering Game, Boston Globe, Mar.
23, 1993, at 54 (describing critic Gene Siskel’s on-air revelation of the plot twist to The
Crying Game).
150
See The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, in Fantasia (Walt Disney Pictures 1940).
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thirty seconds from Fantasia and incorporate it into her own film,
but not into a children’s book.
Some might object to this safe harbor on the ground that it
would negatively impact, for example, sports leagues that currently
license highlights to news broadcasts and later package that same
footage into “Best Moments” DVDs.151 While this safe harbor
might allow for some competition in the derivative works marketplace, we do not believe that allowing thirty-second clips to be
used, either alone or in montage format, would act as a market
substitute for the sporting events themselves, nor do we suspect
that they would substantially undermine the incentive to create
new works.152
Digital editing presents a related, yet different, challenge. In
Forrest Gump, for example, director Robert Zemeckis altered preexisting footage of historical events to make it appear as though
Tom Hanks were interacting with Elvis Presley, John F. Kennedy,
and Richard Nixon.153 Similarly, filmmakers have taken thirtysecond clips from preexisting footage to make it appear as if Fred
Astaire were using a Dirt Devil and John Wayne were drinking a
Coors.154 Employing similar techniques, someone could theoretically cull thirty-second clips from the approximately one hundred
films featuring Samuel L. Jackson155 and then digitally edit the materials to create a single, coherent narrative. Obviously, there are
certain practical limitations to this technique, but it does not seem
fanciful to suppose that someone could draw short film and sound
clips from the 400 episodes of The Simpsons,156 combine them with

151

See, e.g., The NFL’s Greatest Hits (NFL Films 1992).
But see New Boston Television v. Entm’t Sports Programming Network, No. 811010, 1981 WL 1374, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 1981) (rejecting a fair use defense and
issuing a preliminary injunction against the use of sports highlights during news
broadcasts).
153
Forrest Gump (Paramount Pictures 1994).
154
See Leora Broydo, Attack of the Celebrity Vacuum-Cleaner-Salesman Ghouls,
Salon, July 8, 1997, http://www.salon.com/july97/media/media970708.html.
155
See The Internet Movie Database Filmography of Samuel L. Jackson,
http://imdb.com/name/nm0000168/ (last visited May 15, 2007) (listing the actor’s film
and television appearances).
156
See, e.g., Benjamin Toff, ‘Simpsons’ Milestone Boosts Ratings, N.Y. Times, May
22, 2007, at E2 (noting that 400 episodes of The Simpsons have been produced).
152
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original drawings and/or sound dubbing that does not infringe
copyright, and produce a market substitute for a new episode.157
Our solution to this problem? Do nothing. Many of the concerns
with such scenarios are already addressed by other aspects of copyright158 and by other areas of the law generally (most notably
trademark, unfair competition, and right of publicity).159 But if no
other laws are violated, copyright should not stand in the way of
the creative manipulation and reuse of existing materials.160
4. Audiovisual Works (II)
We propose an additional audiovisual safe harbor that expands
upon the first: anyone may include in an audiovisual work any architectural, choreographic, or pictorial work, so long as that work is
not displayed for more than thirty seconds and provided those
thirty seconds comprise no more than ten percent of the new
work.161 We do not draw any distinction between a “featured” dis-

157
The National Lampoon used a similar process to create “The Lost Episode” of
Seinfeld. The Lampoon crafted a new narrative arc by weaving together scenes from
the Seinfeld television program with the infamous video of Michael Richards’ racist
tirade during a stand-up comedy performance. See Greg Connors, Keeper of the
Comedy Flame, Buffalo News, Feb. 4, 2007, at M11.
158
For example, copyright law already extends independent protection to fictional
characters. See, e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660–62 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that fictional characters are independently copyrightable); Walt Disney Prods. v.
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753–55 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that Disney characters such
as Mickey and Minnie Mouse are copyrightable as distinct entities); Detective Comics
v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432, 432–34 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that the character of
Superman was infringed by the similar “attributes and antics” of the Wonderman
character). Although the Ninth Circuit once notoriously held that Dashiell Hammett’s
detective Sam Spade was not copyrightable as a distinct character, Warner Bros. Pictures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), that decision has been roundly criticized
and effectively overturned. See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660 (“The Ninth Circuit has
killed the [Sam Spade] decision, see Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d
1446, 1452 and n.7 (9th Cir. 1988); Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, supra, 581
F.2d at 755 and n.11, though without the usual obsequies . . . .”).
159
See generally Bela G. Lugosi, California Expands the Statutory Right of Publicity
For Deceased Celebrities While Its Courts Are Examining the First Amendment
Limitations of that Statute, 10 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 259, 261, 275, 278 (2000).
160
Furthermore, some content owners have concluded that permitting such uses is
beneficial to their own interests. See, e.g., Slicing, Mashing Shows OK with CBS, Chi.
Sun-Times, Jan. 10, 2007, at 61.
161
The ten percent maximum is employed to prevent certain scenarios from falling
within the safe harbor, such as the conversion of a single photograph into a thirty-
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play and a “background and montage” display162—to ensure clarity
and predictability, any use would be permitted.
This proposal is likely to be significantly more controversial than
the preceding proposals. It would allow, after all, for one hundred
percent of these works to be copied. Yet, in the case of visual
works, it is often difficult to make many productive uses of less
than the entire work.163 Thus, we have proposed a safe harbor designed to facilitate effective use of these works, although we suggest several limitations to prevent potential abuses.
Take the following hypothetical: A photographer arranges three
Peanuts comic strips so that they fill the panel on a single frame of
film, then places three more strips on a second frame, and so on,
until she places the last of 2,160 strips on the 720th frame. Played at
the standard rate of twenty-four frames per second,164 the entire
film would last thirty seconds. Yet one could also pause the film
and watch it frame by frame, making it effectively a Peanuts ebook containing nearly six years’ worth of strips.
While this may strike some readers as problematic, it is difficult
to distinguish this scenario from the case of an end-user copying
thirty seconds from an animated film. In that case, the end-user
copies 720 (or more) frames from an existing work, even though
each frame contains a distinct (and independently copyrightable)
drawing.
Our solution is to create a separate cap for visual works, including serialized or sequential art. To fall within the safe harbor, an
second short film set to repeat over and over again, making it virtually indistinguishable from a digital image.
162
Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 253.8 (2006) (setting the royalty rates for the use of pictorial
works by public broadcasting entities, with varying rates depending on whether the
use of a work is designated a “featured” display or a “background or montage” display).
163
See Tushnet, supra note 26, at 588 (“Requiring complete or near-complete copying to find infringement would be most helpful with literary works and least helpful
with visual works, which often need to be shown in full for ‘quotation’ to be effective.”); see also Crews, supra note 109, at 634 (noting that “[t]he use of visual images . . . will most likely require the entire work, a fact that most often weighs against
fair use”).
164
It is worth noting that digital compression allows for the creation of works that
contain many more than twenty-four frames per second. See, e.g., Candus Thomson,
Speed and Danger Rise; Falls, Injuries Are Accumulating at the Winter Games, Balt.
Sun, Feb. 15, 2006, at 1A (noting that NBC’s Olympic coverage used a camera that
captured two thousand frames per second).
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end-user may not copy more than three visual works of art that are
part of a single sequence or series, or feature the same copyrighted
character. The key to making this limitation work is finding a useful way to distinguish copying 720 frames of Peanuts comic strips,
which are intended to be viewed separately and which should not
fall within the safe harbor, from copying 720 frames worth of
Mickey Mouse images, which are intended to be viewed as a single
cartoon and to which the safe harbor should apply. Here, the
Copyright Act comes to our aid. The Act defines the visual portion
of “audiovisual works” as “consist[ing] of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment.”165 Applying this definition to the work being copied would
allow the safe harbor to capture films, including animation, while
excluding comic strips, graphic novels, or a series of paintings or
photographs.
A separate but related concern is that this safe harbor would unfairly burden certain media and certain types of works. For example, while a newspaper would need to license a photograph to use
alongside a story, a television broadcast could run the same image
for free (for up to thirty seconds). An Internet news site, meanwhile, might string together a slide show containing the ten best
photographs on the subject. One way to address this issue would be
to resuscitate the “fresh news” rationale of International News Service v. Associated Press166 and require a one-year postpublication
moratorium before pictorial works are eligible for this particular
safe harbor. While this is far from a perfect solution, we believe
that it would not unduly undermine the incentive effect of copyright law; that is, the ability to make fleeting use of images after
one year should not substantially erode the incentive to create new
works.
D. Implications
Implementation of our proposed safe harbors—modest though
they may seem to some—is likely to have far-reaching implications
for the real world. Such implementation would secure the practice
165
166

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
248 U.S. 215, 235, 245–46 (1918).
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of incorporating brief quotes from preexisting literary works into
new ones, allowing Professors Brandenburger and Nalebuff to
quote a line from “Sympathy for the Devil” without fear of legal
reprisal. Likewise, it would legitimize the art of sampling167 and
provide greater freedom to a wide variety of creators, from the authors of trivia games168 to collage artists and documentary filmmakers.169 As we have seen, these artists often seek to appropriate only
small amounts of expression that nevertheless constitute a significant contribution to their new works. Without a robust and predictable fair use doctrine, however, they are left with little choice
but to secure permission for their use of the material, often from
multiple copyright owners, and their efforts are easily thwarted by
high transaction costs or strategic holdups. Safe harbors invert the
system, guaranteeing protection for the most fundamental acts of
appropriation.
The proposed scheme would also shelter users who inadvertently or unconsciously reproduce small amounts of protected expression. A brief display of a protected quilt, poster, or a photograph in a film or a television series170 would not give rise to liability
so long as it fell within a safe harbor. This change would be especially significant for the new generation of YouTube authors, who
are generally unaware of the minutiae of copyright law. We are not
suggesting that widespread ignorance of the law justifies changing
it but rather that the law should recognize and facilitate these
flourishing new forms of expression that make modest uses of preexisting material.
Furthermore, our proposal would also reduce the problem of
ideological refusals and copyright misuse. Content owners often
167
But cf. Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Get a license or do not sample.”).
168
See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 135, 146 (2d
Cir. 1998) (concluding that a Seinfeld trivia book was not protected by fair use). While
the safe harbor would apply to trivia questions that directly quote particular lines of
dialogue, it would have little application to instances where the material copied is not
words but broader concepts.
169
See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing the struggle to secure
the rights necessary to broadcast the documentary Eyes on the Prize).
170
See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 71–73, 81 (2d Cir.
1997) (finding that the use of a pictorial work that appeared on screen for less than
thirty seconds was not so clearly fair use as to sustain defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
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use restrictive licenses and the threat of litigation to censor certain
types of commentary171 or critical reviews.172 With safe harbor protection, so long as the amount taken falls within the prescribed limits, users would be free to reproduce expression for any purpose.
Looking forward, the adoption of fair use harbors may enable a
more limited version of Google Book Search.173 Although the fullscale copying of entire books would remain beyond the bounds of
our safe harbors, our proposal would guarantee Google the right to
display, in response to users’ search requests, segments not exceeding three hundred words from any literary work posted on the
Internet now or in the future.
But what would be the effect of our proposal on the production
of new works? The short answer is that the implementation of safe
harbors is unlikely to significantly chill the incentive to create new
books, songs, and films. The safe harbors we propose should have a
rather minimal effect on the revenues of most copyright owners.
Many of the uses we seek to protect are of relatively small value,
such that, given positive transaction costs, users would generally
choose to forgo them rather than negotiate a license. Second, even
if content owners could collect payment for some of the uses that
fall within the safe harbors, it may not be socially desirable to let
them do so.174
Formalization of our scheme would have a small negative effect
on the income of most current copyright owners, but at the same
time it would decrease the cost of creating new works by allowing
creators to reproduce limited amounts of protected expression for
free. If Professor Larry Lessig is correct that contemporary culture
171

See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 & n.6 (11th
Cir. 2001) (Marcus, J., concurring) (noting that the Margaret Mitchell estate refuses
to license Gone With The Wind to derivative works that deal with miscegenation or
homosexuality). DC Comics is notoriously zealous in suppressing any suggestion of
Batman and Robin as lovers. See, e.g., Jeet Heer, Pow! Wham! Permission Denied!,
Lingua Franca, Mar. 2001, at 21, 21–22; Gallery Told to Drop ‘Gay’ Batman, BBC
News, Aug. 19, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/arts/4167032.stm.
172
See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
manufacturer of Beanie Babies attempts to stifle criticism by requiring, in exchange
for a license to publish Beanie Baby photographs in a collector’s guide, the right to
veto any text in the book).
173
See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing Google Book Search).
174
See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text (discussing music sampling and
ringtones).
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develops incrementally and incorporation of preexisting material is
emerging as the new mode of production,175 then the establishment
of safe harbors would actually increase production and enrich the
pool of creative expression.
E. Salvaging Fair Use in the Digital Age
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)176 effects an
important shift in the traditional balance of copyright law by prohibiting users from circumventing Technological Protection Measures (“TPMs”)177 employed by copyright holders to protect content.
The use of TPMs is ubiquitous: DVDs, CDs, and downloadable
files are regularly encrypted to prevent their duplication.178 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA do not contain a fair use
exception; Congress consciously decided not to allow circumvention even for the purpose of making a fair use of protected material.179
We suggest one final application of these fair use safe harbors: a
requirement, imposed by Congress, that TPMs allow a single, portion-limited fair use of any protected work. This is perhaps the
most radical of our suggestions, insofar as it seeks to create a previously nonexistent partial “right” to fair use in the digital context.
Under the current copyright framework, fair use is properly
characterized as a Hohfeldian “privilege” rather than as a
“right.”180 That is, the public is free to make fair uses of protected
175
Lessig, supra note 34, at 37–38; see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or,
Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369, 374 (2002) (discussing the value
of large-scale collaborations in information production).
176
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in part at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–
1205 (2000)).
177
This is also referred to as Digital Rights Management (“DRM”). See, e.g., Edited
& Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on the Law & Technology of Digital
Rights Management, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 697, 760 (2003). But see Brad Stone &
Jeff Leeds, Amazon to Sell Music Without Copy Protection, N.Y. Times, May 17,
2007, at C1 (discussing the growing trend of distributing digital music files without encryption).
178
In some cases, the content distributors go to extreme lengths to ensure the material cannot be copied. See, e.g., Joe Morgenstern, The Screens Have Eyes, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 10–11, 2005, at P3.
179
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 86 (1998) (discussing the rejection of “an equivalent fair use defense”).
180
See Hohfeld, supra note 55, at 30.
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works, but rightsholders owe no affirmative “duty” to make their
works available for such uses.181 So, for example, a playwright cannot stop a critic from writing a scathing review of her play,182 but
she is under no obligation to provide the critic with tickets to a performance. Indeed, that playwright could choose to bar a critic’s access to the work by any number of legal means,183 and fair use
would provide the critic with no recourse.
This dichotomy is perhaps seen most clearly in the context of the
DMCA. The DMCA sought to facilitate the use of TPMs as effective tools to prevent copyright infringement by creating civil and
criminal penalties for their circumvention.184 The statute, by its own
terms, does nothing to alter the fair use framework;185 nevertheless,
its effect is to virtually negate fair use with respect to many works
offered in digital media.186 This is, of course, consistent with the
Hohfeldian framework. Content users are still free to make fair use
of protected materials, if they can independently obtain access to
them. But they have no right to circumvent protection measures,
just as theatre critics have no right to sneak into a playhouse by
breaking open the back door.
Commentators have harshly criticized the anticircumvention
provisions of the DMCA, citing concern over the potential chilling
effect of the legislation on free speech and especially on the ability
of content owners to eliminate certain forms of fair use.187 These
concerns are well founded.

181

See Johnstone, supra note 55, at 368–70 (analyzing fair use in Hohfeldian terms).
This is assuming, of course, that the critic’s review otherwise meets the requirements of fair use.
183
For example, the playwright could prohibit the use of photography to capture the
performance, even if the film would be used solely for fair use purposes.
184
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201; see also Sharon R. King, Consumers Still Seem Resistant to
Some New High-End Electronics, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1999, at C1 (noting that several
motion picture studios held off on releasing their most popular titles in DVD format,
for fear that the copy protection would be circumvented).
185
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.”).
186
See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 80–81 (2001).
187
See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Seven Years
Under the DMCA 1 (2006), http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCA_unintended_v4.pdf.
182
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The problem is that until now there seemed to be no viable alternative. The opposite solution—permitting circumvention for fair
use purposes—would in all likelihood throw copyright’s balance off
in the other direction. Creating a statutory exception that gives
content users the ability to circumvent TPMs for any fair use purpose may open the floodgates for mass infringements. The reason
for this is straightforward: ex ante, there is no effective way to distinguish the true fair users from the spurious ones. Likewise, there
is no ex ante test capable of evaluating the intended use that would
allow fair uses to occur while still preventing those that are improper. Thus, any system that enabled circumvention for possible
fair uses would inevitably permit substantial unfair uses as well.
Our proposed safe harbors present an opportunity to revive fair
use with respect to content stored in digital media and thereby reinstate the balance between content owners and users. Under our
proposed system, there would be no difficulty establishing a system
that permitted end-users to make certain fair uses of protected
works. Therefore, Congress could mandate that content providers
employ TPMs that enable end-users to access the minimal amounts
of protected material that the safe harbors would otherwise allow.
To prevent repeated application of the safe harbor as a means of
engaging in potentially unfair uses—for example, copying an entire
film in thirty-second increments—the TPMs should be designed to
permit a single safe harbor-sized appropriation of any particular
copy of a work. Thus, someone who purchases a new Blade Runner
DVD188 would be able to copy any thirty-second segment, but after
that initial appropriation, the TPMs could bar any additional copying over the lifetime of the disc.
It is important to note that this proposal would not alter the current DMCA framework; all it requires from Congress is the reclassification of fair use as a Hohfeldian right and the imposition of a
corresponding duty on content distributors to create a limited right
of access. Such a move is not entirely without precedent. Congress
has promulgated similar TPM carve-outs in other contexts. For example, the DMCA prevents copyright owners and/or content distributors from encrypting television broadcasts in a manner that

188

Blade Runner (Warner Bros. 1982).
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would prevent the public from recording them for later viewing,189
essentially creating a Hohfeldian right to engage in the “timeshifting” that the Supreme Court had previously found to be fair
use.190
As with all of our proposals, this limited right of access is no
magic bullet—it will not permit all fair uses of protected works.
But it nevertheless represents a substantial improvement over the
current system, which does not allow any fair uses (without prior
approval).
III. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
Although we have attempted to design the safe harbors narrowly, so as to minimize the risk of abuse and other ill effects, we
are mindful of the fact that several objections and criticisms might
be raised against our proposal. In this Part, we address several of
those concerns.
A. Safe Harbors May Become a Ceiling, Rather than a Floor
The strongest objection to the adoption of safe harbors in the
past has been the fear that the safe harbors would become a ceiling, rather than a floor. This concern has led James Gibson to
summarily reject the idea of safe harbors. In his words, “courts
convert safe harbors into the only harbors, floors into ceilings, and
minimums into maximums.”191
It is tempting to dismiss this objection as theoretically meritless;
after all, copyright holders, users, and judges are all perfectly capable of understanding the plain meaning of the language. But as
189

17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)(2).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 444, 456 (1984) (holding that private, noncommercial time-shifting of television broadcasts is fair use). The
DMCA also requires content distributors to provide authorized transmitting organizations (such as radio and television stations) the means to make ephemeral and archival copies of the encrypted works that they broadcast, and permits those organizations to circumvent the encryption if the content distributors fail to provide them with
the means to do so “in a timely manner.” See 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2). Another example
is the Audio Home Recording Act, which requires digital audio recording devices to
contain a “Serial Copy Management System” that allows end-users to make first generation copies of digital audio recordings, but encodes those copies with a tag to prevent anyone from making copies of those copies. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1002.
191
Gibson, supra note 16, at 398 (footnote omitted).
190
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Yogi Berra famously observed, “[i]n theory there’s no difference
between theory and practice. But in practice, there is.”192 Take the
case of the Classroom Guidelines, for example.193 Although they
purport to set a minimum, for many educators they have become a
de facto maximum, because their institutions will not permit any
uses that exceed them.194
There are several important differences between the Classroom
Guidelines and our proposed safe harbors. The Guidelines came to
be viewed as maximums because they were set at a substantially
higher threshold. They were negotiated, in effect, not to reflect a
minimum level of utility, but rather as a sort of middle ground
compromise. Given this status, it was easier for parties on all sides
to fall into the trap of letting the floor become the ceiling.
Moreover, the Classroom Guidelines lacked the force of law and
thus were not binding on courts. Without the force of law, the
Guidelines became a convenient benchmark for litigation. For example, New York University, in order to settle a lawsuit filed by
the Association of American Publishers, agreed to be bound by the
Classroom Guidelines, not as a minimum but as a maximum.195 This
type of outcome has led some scholars to conclude that any brightline fair use rules would pose a danger of becoming ceilings rather
than floors,196 but this sort of analysis misses the point. The extant
192
This quotation may be apocryphal. Although generally attributed to Yogi Berra,
it is also sometimes credited to computer scientist Jan L.A. van de Snepscheut. See
Said What? Quotations: Theory Quotes, http://www.saidwhat.co.uk/bio/theory (last
visited May 16, 2007).
193
See supra notes 109–125 and accompanying text (discussing the Classroom
Guidelines).
194
Eugene R. Quinn, Jr. & Michelle Beveridge, Legal Issues in Building Course
Web Sites: Copyright Law for Academics, 26 Hamline L. Rev. 83, 117 (2002).
195
See Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 CIV 8333 (ADS), 1983 WL
1134, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983); see also Crews, supra note 109, at 641 (“For all
practical purposes, the minimum standards of the original guidelines became maximum standards at NYU.”); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Conflicts on the University
Campus: The First Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture, 47 J. Copyright
Soc’y U.S.A. 291, 313 n.36 (2000) (noting that the settlement agreement in AddisonWesley produced a “‘chilling’ effect on faculty members inclined to invoke broader
fair use permissions”).
196
See, e.g., Crews, supra note 109, at 697 (arguing that fair use guidelines should be
flexible rather than rigid); Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of
Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 771 (2006) (arguing that nonbinding guidelines are often treated in a precedent-like manner); Gregory
K. Klingsporn, The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) and the Future of Fair Use
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safe harbors, despite claiming to be minimums, became maximums
precisely because they did not carry the force of law.
Further, it is not clear how courts could alter current fair use
doctrine in a direction less favorable to would-be copiers. A review
of the case law reveals only a handful of bright spots for users. At
this time, the only uses that seem to enjoy relative immunity from
liability are parodies197 and home videorecording for purposes of
time shifting.198 It is hard to imagine that courts would change their
positions on these uses were our proposal to be adopted.
More importantly, even if the critics are absolutely correct, we
still believe that on the whole our proposal will improve upon the
current state of affairs. We concede that our safe harbors will exert
something akin to a gravitational force on end-users. To picture
this, imagine Artist A as she contemplates the inclusion of a short
film clip in her new multimedia work. Under the current system,
she might decide to incorporate thirty-five seconds and hope that
the use would be found fair. Under our proposed system, she
would have a strong incentive to limit that clip to thirty seconds.
We submit, however, that for every Artist A who decides to limit
her copying to within the safe harbor limits, there will be Artists B
through Z who would make fair uses that they would have otherwise foregone for fear of litigation. To understand this more
clearly, the key is to see that in the current framework, the gravitational pull is toward no use or licensing. Safe harbors would essentially shift the center of gravity, pulling down some Artist A-types,
while pulling up far more Artist B- through Z-types. Thus, the sum
total of fair uses would be far greater within a safe harbor system.199
Our proposed safe harbors also run the risk of a different pitfall:
becoming a victim of their own success. Courts have sometimes
Guidelines, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 101, 122 (1999) (arguing that “fair use guidelines should be primarily a statement of principles” and that the current system “encourages [the use of clearly defined examples of fair use] as a maximum rather than a
minimum standard”).
197
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
198
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
199
Cf. Gibson, supra note 16, at 887–906 (discussing the problem of “doctrinal feedback” in copyright law, which encourages some copyright users to apply for licenses
even when their intended use of copyrighted material would be a fair use and discourages others from attempting to use the copyrighted material at all); Wagner, supra note 65, at 426–29 (noting the increasing uncertainty among copyright users regarding whether their intended use will be protected by the fair use doctrine).
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looked at the traditions and customs of the copying community to
help determine whether a particular use is fair.200 Although not part
of the literal wording of the statute, this sort of analysis draws on
the view, most closely associated with David Hume, that the law
should mirror popular practices and understandings.201 It follows,
then, that if the safe harbors exhibit a sufficient gravitational pull,
courts might later conclude that staying within the harbors represents the community norm and that exceeding them violates the
customary practice, thus weighing against a finding of fair use.202
It is precisely this fear that has motivated, in part, the recent
movement to encourage documentary filmmakers to make more
fair uses in order to establish certain practices more clearly as a
tradition within the community.203 In the context of our proposed
safe harbors, however, we think that this fear is exaggerated: it
simply does not follow that the addition of safe harbors would lead
to the demise of more robust fair uses. Analysis that relies on industry practices is unlikely to be so myopic as to disregard the existence of a range of uses, and, as now, litigants would be able to in200

See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 593 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Nation’s stated purpose of scooping the competition
should under those circumstances have no negative bearing on the claim of fair use.
Indeed the Court’s reliance on this factor would seem to amount to little more than
distaste for the standard journalistic practice of seeking to be the first to publish
news.”); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “framing
and other traditional means of mounting and displaying art do not infringe authors’
exclusive right to make derivative works”); Triangle Publ’ns v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980) (giving weight to the fact that the alleged
infringement took the form of “a comparative advertisement done in a manner which
is generally accepted in the advertising industry”).
201
See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1659, 1692 (1988) (noting the “tradition emphasizing the limited power of the
positive law and the degree to which it must and should track customs and popular
understandings—a tradition whose most insightful exponent was David Hume”); see
also H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 44–48 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the role of custom in shaping law); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 484–513 (Prometheus Books 1992) (1739) (discussing the role of custom in property law).
202
Cf. Hirtle, supra note 100, at 549 (noting that the Gentlemen’s Agreement, despite its origins as a voluntary guideline, came to be viewed “as a defacto [sic] cap on
the extent of acceptable reproduction by librarians and researchers”).
203
Ass’n of Indep. Video & Filmmakers et al., Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement
of Best Practices in Fair Use 1 (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/bestpractices.pdf
(“Fair
use is shaped, in part, by the practice of the professional communities that employ
it.”).
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form courts of the various practices that continue to exceed the
proposed safe harbor thresholds.
B. De Minimis
A second potential criticism of our proposal is that it is unnecessary in light of the de minimis doctrine. The doctrine forgives technical violations of the law where the impact of the transgression is
so trivial as to be essentially nonexistent.204 Readers familiar with
the application of the doctrine to copyright law know that this argument misses the mark.
The failing of de minimis is that, like fair use itself, it has become
a vague and unpredictable standard. Courts have applied the doctrine in a highly inconsistent fashion, reaching widely divergent results. Moreover, judges evaluate a claim of de minimis copying not
just for the quantitative amount of material copied, but also for the
qualitative amount: if the material represents the “heart” of the
work, then a court will be far less likely to find that the copying was
fair or de minimis.205 Content users cannot know, ex ante, how this
open-ended evaluation may turn out. More to the point, normatively, content users should be allowed to make minor appropriations, even from the qualitative “heart” of a work. Our safe harbors would allow this usage in a manner that the de minimis
doctrine clearly does not.
A further problem with the de minimis doctrine is that it has
been construed so narrowly in copyright cases as to render it virtually meaningless. As Rebecca Tushnet has noted, many of the important types of uses require that the audience be able to recognize
the material being copied.206 Yet “a taking is considered de minimis
only if it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience

204
See, e.g., On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the de minimis doctrine); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 74–76
(2d Cir. 1997) (same).
205
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548, 564–65 (finding that the three to four hundred words copied constituted the “heart” of the original work); Dun & Bradstreet
Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, 307 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that de
minimis did not apply to the copying of twenty-seven lines of code from a 525,000 line
program because those twenty-seven lines were of high qualitative value).
206
Tushnet, supra note 26, at 583.
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would not recognize the appropriation.”207 As a result, de minimis
will never be available to end-users seeking to quote a short passage from a book or to play a brief scene from a film.
For all these reasons, the de minimis doctrine does not provide a
real alternative to our proposal. As it stands, the doctrine serves no
substantive function in sheltering users from liability. Due to its
narrow construction, the doctrine has become a dead letter. Hence,
there would be nothing lost if it were to be supplanted by our proposal.
C. Strategic Abuse
A further concern that might be raised against our proposal is
that it is susceptible to strategic abuse. To illustrate, consider the
proposed safe harbor for video clips. If the appropriation of any
thirty-second segment is a per se fair use, then an individual could
post the first thirty seconds of a film on her web page and make it
available to download. Another individual could then post the next
thirty seconds, and so on.208 In this manner, the entire film could be
posted online, with little the copyright holder could do to prevent
members of the public from obtaining the entire film and reassembling it on their own computers.209
This concern is not as grave as it first appears. Assembling the
film would exceed the safe harbor and would clearly constitute a
copyright infringement under traditional fair use analysis. Just as in
patent law, which has had to deal with similar problems of strategic
abuse, copyright law provides for causes of action for contributory
and vicarious liability. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the patent
law approach and held that the active inducement of copyright infringement is actionable.210 Accordingly, any person who would
seek to coordinate the reassembly of a film, or any other work,
207

Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986); see also On Davis, 246 F.3d
at 173 (finding that “the de minimis doctrine is not applicable” because “the infringing item is highly noticeable”).
208
Arguably, this could even be done by a single individual, claiming that each segment constituted a different “work.”
209
This same logic could be applied with equal force to the safe harbors for appropriating portions of literary or musical works.
210
545 U.S. 913, 940–41 (2005).
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from discrete parts (by, say, providing a list of websites where each
individual piece could be located) would face potential liability.211
A separate but related concern is that the creation of these safe
harbors would artificially alter the course of technological and artistic development. In light of the Sony decision, for example, filesharing services made sure their devices were capable of “substantial non-infringing uses.”212 This suggests that if safe harbors take
away a certain revenue stream, content owners will likely try
adapting to recapture it. For example, television networks might
make their shows available for download in one minute increments, claiming that each portion is an individual work (and thus
limiting the amount that could be copied to six seconds per minute). This is not so farfetched: writers for The Simpsons already
build their episodes around one- to two-minute stand-alone segments designed to be posted on the Internet,213 and Fox produced a
spin-off of the television show 24 made up of twenty-four oneminute episodes that could be downloaded onto cellular phones.214
Such strategies may require courts to decide what constitutes the
“total work,” but they do not undermine the safe harbor itself. Furthermore, market forces provide an inherent limitation on the ability of content providers to manipulate their works and distribute
them piecemeal.
D. The Optimal Level of Fair Use
The final potential objection we wish to address is more general.
Our analysis so far has proceeded on the assumption that the cur211
Cf. Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., 248 F.3d 1376, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(citing Fromberg, Inc. v. Thomhill, 315 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1963), to argue that the
term “active inducement” “is as broad as the range of actions by which one in fact
causes, or urges, or encourages, or aids another to infringe a patent”); Fromberg, 315
F.2d at 411 n.11 (quoting Walker on Patents 1764–71 (Anthony William Deller ed.,
Supp. 1962), to note that active inducement includes “passing on information intending to bring about infringement”).
212
See Jennifer S. Lee, Digital Video Recorders: First, ReplayTV 4000 Must Face
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rent fair use regime results in too little fair use of copyrighted expression. This, of course, raises the question of what is the optimal
level of fair use. Questions of optimum pose a Herculean challenge
for legal theorists.215 In the patent context, Professor William
Nordhaus demonstrated that the optimal duration of patent protection balances the utility of incentives for innovation against the
costs produced by monopoly-induced deadweight loss.216 Unfortunately, determining where this balance lies in the real world has
proven to be elusive. Determination of the optimal level of fair use
would similarly require policymakers to analyze a host of theoretic
and empirical variables. Even a purely theoretical estimation of the
optimal level of fair use necessitates complex computations. Professor William Fisher, who attempted to establish a framework for
such a calculus, expressed serious skepticism about the usefulness
of his analysis for judges.217
We offer a two-pronged response to this challenge. First, as several leading copyright scholars have noted, fair use in its current
form offers very little protection to speech interests. As Professor
Neil Netanel observed, “[T]oday’s fair use doctrine provides no
more than a bare, insubstantial trace of that protection [of First
Amendment interests].”218 If we think that fair use is valuable at all
in safeguarding these interests,219 it is hard to justify a doctrine that
provides protection in name only.
Second, and more importantly, we posit that our proposal is
beneficial irrespective of whatever the optimal level of fair use
might be. The establishment of fair use harbors would reduce the
ambiguity that surrounds the current doctrine. Regardless of one’s
opinion on the optimal level of fair use, it is advantageous to clear
the doctrine of unnecessary ambiguity. Ambiguity distorts fair use:
it favors risk-seeking users and disfavors risk-averse ones. It should
be noted in this regard that some commentators have estimated
215
For discussion of this challenge in a more general property context, see Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 531 (2005).
216
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that most users are indeed risk averse.220 Whether this assessment is
correct is ultimately an empirical question. Irrespective of the total
number, though, there is no good policy or textual reason to favor
risk-seeking users.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we have presented the case for establishing a system of fair use safe harbors and demonstrated how this system
might be implemented. The benefits stemming from our proposal
are substantial. A system of safe harbors would introduce muchneeded certainty into this important doctrine. It would enable users to reproduce certain quantities of copyrighted expression without fear of liability, turning many would-be users from potential infringers (or reluctant abstainers) into legitimate, productive
borrowers. These changes are especially desirable in an era when
an increasing amount of content is produced by laypersons outside
the traditional copyright industries, and the creative culture relies
on borrowing from preexisting material. The incremental nature of
artistic creativity suggests that allowing limited safe harbor access
to expressive building blocks may enhance, rather than retard, the
production of new works.
Naturally, not everyone will benefit from the proposed change.
As Judge Guido Calabresi famously observed, virtually every move
from the status quo will work to someone’s disadvantage.221 Some
content owners will oppose any change in the current fair use regime. Yet it is the overall effect that should count, and that is likely
to be positive. What is more, our proposal also holds the key to revitalizing fair use in the digital age, thereby restoring the intended
balance of copyright law.
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